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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF OSWEGO FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
IAFF, LOCAL 2707, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27221 
- and -
CITY OF OSWEGO, 
Respondent. 
SATTER & ANDREWS, LLP (MIMI C. SATTER and MATHEW E. BERGERON 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (ELAYNE GOLD AND DIONNE A. 
WHEATLEY of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Oswego (City) to 
a decision by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) on a charge filed by the City of Oswego Firefighters Association, 
IAFF, Local 2707 (Association) alleging that the City violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally eliminated, pursuant 
to a memorandum dated October 26, 2006, a practice that permitted bargaining unit 
employees to wash and wax their persona! vehicles in. Citv fire stations during work 
time.1 
1
 41 PERB 1T4502 (2008). 
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o 
The Assistant Director found that the City violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act because 
personal use of an employer's facilities by bargaining unit members constitutes a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and the stipulated facts established an enforceable 
past practice with respect to that mandatory subject. The Assistant Director, however, 
dismissed the Association's claim under §209-a. 1(a) of the Act. In addition, she 
rejected the City's waiver or duty satisfaction arguments, contained in its brief, on the 
ground that the City had waived those affirmative defenses by failing to plead them in its 
answer. 
As a remedy, the Assistant Director ordered the City to rescind the October 26, 
2006 memorandum, restore the prior practice permitting bargaining unit members to 
wash and wax their personal vehicles in the City fire stations and make whole, with 
interest, those bargaining unit members who expended money for the cost of washing 
and waxing their vehicles as a result of the October 26, 2006 memorandum. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The City excepts to the Assistant Director's conclusions and remedial order. The 
City asserts that the Assistant Director erred in finding that the personal use of an 
employer's facilities and equipment by unit employees is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations and in finding that the Fire Chief had sufficient authority to bind the City 
with respect to the practice. It aiso asserts that the Assistant Director erred in rejecting 
the waiver or duty satisfaction defenses. Finally, it claims that the Assistant Director 
incorrectly ordered a make whole remedy for those bargaining unit members who 
expended money to wash and wax their vehicles as the result of the City eliminating the ;
 J 
practice. 
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The Association supports the Assistant Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant Director but modify the remedial 
order. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the Assistant Director's decision and are repeated 
here only as necessary to address the exceptions. The case was decided on a 
stipulated record submitted by the parties in lieu of a hearing. 
The Association represents a bargaining unit composed of uniformed members 
of the City's Fire Department with the Fire Chief being expressly excluded from the 
recognized unit. The collectively negotiated agreement between the City and 
Association expired on December 21, 2006. 
For over 21 years, bargaining unit members have been permitted, while on duty, 
to wash and wax their personal vehicles in the two City fire stations on weekends and 
after 3:00 p.m. on weekdays. Since becoming Fire Chief in May 2000, Edward J. Geers 
(Geers) was cognizant of the practice and permitted the practice to continue. 
In April 2002, then City Mayor John Gosek and Geers unilaterally promulgated 
the most recent version of the City Fire Department's regulations containing 16 
sections, including sections on firefighter duties and general rules of conduct. The Fire 
Department regulations identify the Fire Chief as the department's executive head with 
ultimate operational responsibilities over discipline, efficiency and training of staff, as 
well as the maintenance and repair of all equipment. However, the regulations are silent 
with respect to the practice at issue here. 
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On October 26, 2006, Geers issued a memorandum, at the direction of acting 
City Mayor Randy Bateman, prohibiting all Fire Department personnel from washing 
and waxing their personal vehicles in the fire stations. It is undisputed that the City did 
not bargain with the Association prior to issuing the October 26, 2006 memorandum. 
DISCUSSION 
In an analogous case, Westbury Water and Fire District,2 the Board held that a 
practice permitting unit employees to bring their personal vehicles into an employer's 
shop to make repairs is a mandatory subject. Therefore, we reject the City's exception 
challenging the Assistant Director's conclusion that Association unit member's personal 
use of the City's fire stations to wash and wax their vehicles is a mandatory subject. 
The City, in its exceptions, also contends that the Assistant Director erred in 
finding a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act on the ground that the Fire Chief allegedly 
lacked sufficient authority to bind the City based on the Board's 2004 decision in County 
of Nassau.3 In addition, it contends that the Assistant Director's application of the 
Board's decision in Chenango Forks Central School District4 (hereinafter, Chenango) to 
the present case is erroneous and unfair to the City's position. In the alternative, it 
requests a remand to permit the City to submit additional evidence demonstrating that 
the City lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the practice because the Chenango 
decision was issued after it entered into the stipulation. We disagree. 
2
 13 PERB H3019 (1980). 
337PERBP014(2004). 
4
 40 PERB fl3012(2007). 
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By stipulation, the City and Association agreed that Fire Chief Geers had actual 
knowledge of the past practice and acquiesced in its continuation for over six years. The 
broad scope of Geers' duties and powers, as delineated in section 3 of the Fire 
Department's regulations, clearly demonstrate that he is the executive head of the 
departmentwith ultimate authority and responsibility over all departmentoperations. 
In Chenango, the Board clarified the applicable test for determining whether a 
binding past practice exists under the Act. The restatement was necessitated by various 
inconsistent articulations of that test subsequent to the Board's most authoritative 
description of the test in a 1991 County of Nassau5 decision: the "practice was 
unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the 
circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees 
that the [practice] would continue."6 In restating the test in Chenango, we expressly 
overruled Board decisions that required a charging party to prove, as part of its prima 
facie case, knowledge or acquiescence by a managerial or high level supervisory 
employee. We recognized that a long term practice alone, under normal circumstances, 
constitutes circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. But such a 
prima facie showing is subject to an employer's affirmative defense that it lacked actual 
or constructive knowledge of the practice. Constructive knowledge of a past practice 
may be found when a practice is reasonably subject to an employer's managerial and/or 
524PERBfl3029(1991). 
6
 Supra, note 5, at 3058 (footnote omitted). 
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supervisory responsibilities and duties.7 This would include instances involving the 
employer's delegation of such duties and responsibilities to a department head. 
The record fully supports the Assistant Director's finding of an enforceable past 
practice. The uninterrupted 21-year length of the past practice is more than sufficient to 
establish that unit members had a reasonable expectation that the past practice would 
continue and to create a rebuttable presumption that during that 21-year period, the City 
had acquiesced in or condoned the practice. Furthermore, a remand is unnecessary 
because the stipulated record clearly establishes that the City had both actual and 
constructive knowledge of the past practice. Fire Chief Geers' awareness and 
acceptance of the practice for six years, combined with his managerial and supervisory 
authority under the department's rules and regulations, are sufficient to bind the City 
with respect to the past practice rendering a remand unnecessary.8 
The City's challenge to the Assistant Director's rejection of its contract waiver or 
duty satisfaction defense is similarly without merit. The City did not plead either 
affirmative defense in its answer and, therefore, those defenses were waived.9 
7
 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 1J3005 at p. 36 (2008). 
8
 We would reach the same conclusion in this case based upon the pre-Chenango 
decision in County of Nassau, 38 PERB 1J3005 (2005). In that decision, the Board 
concluded that high level supervisors with such titles as a "Commissioner or Deputy 
Commissioner of a county-wide department have at least implied, if not actual, authority 
to bind the County to a past practice." Supra at 3015. As noted in our decision herein, 
the Fire Chief of the City of Oswego is the executive head of the City's Fire Department. 
He is, therefore, the equivalent of a Commissioner in Nassau County, with even more 
authority than a Deputy Commissioner. 
9
 New York City Transit Auth, 20 PERB 1J3037 (1987), confirmed sub nom., 147 AD2d 
574, 22 PERB fl7001 (2d Dept 1989). 
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We next turn to the City's exception challenging the Assistant Director's 
proposed remedial order requiring it to make whole any unit employees who expended 
money to wash and wax their personal vehicles as a result of the City's October 26, 
2006 memorandum. Contrary to the City's argument, proof of damages or a prior 
request for reimbursement is_ unnecessary in the adjudication of the merits of a 
charge.10 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the proposed make whole remedy can be 
interpreted to require the City to reimburse unit members for monies expended beyond 
the cost of an alternative location to wash and wax their personal vehicles as a result of 
the October 26, 2006 memorandum, it is hereby modified. The stipulated description of 
the past practice is limited to permitting unit members to wash and wax their personal 
vehicles in the fire stations; the stipulated practice does not include the City providing 
the materials necessary to do so. 
If the parties are unable to agree upon which unit members are entitled to 
reimbursement under the order, either party may request the Board to reopen the case 
on the question of damages.11 Alternatively, if unit employees expended money on 
materials only as the result of the unilateral change in the stipulated practice, the make-
whole portion of the remedial order would not have any application. 
10
 State of New York (DMNA), 24 PERB P024 (1991), confirmed sub nom. State of 
New York (DMNA) v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 187 AD2d 78, 26 PERB 1J7001 
(3d Dept 1993); County of Onondaga, 24 PERB 1J3014 (1991), confirmed sub nom. 
County of Onondaga v Kinsella, 187 AD2d 1014, 25 PERB fl7015 (4th Dept 1992), Iv 
denied, 81 NY2d 706, 26 PERB fl7003 (1993). 
11
 County of Broome, 22 PERB 1J3019 (1989). 
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Based on the foregoing, we deny the City's exceptions, affirm the Assistant 
Director's decision sustaining the Association's improper practice charge but modify the 
remedial order. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City rescind that portion of the October 26, 
2006 memorandum prohibiting the.washingand-waxing personal vehicles on weekends 
and after 3:00 p.m. on weekdays in the City's fire stations, restore the practice prior to the 
October 26, 2006 memorandum permitting the washing and waxing, and make whole any 
unit employee who expended money on items other than materials due to the unilateral 
change in the stipulated practice, announced in the October 26, 2006 memorandum, until 
such time as said practice is restored, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
DATED: May 20, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkc^vitz, Chairman 
7
 Robert £ Hite, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Oswego in the unit represented by 
the City of Oswego Firefighters Association, IAFF, Local 2707, that the City of 
Oswego: 
1. will rescind that portion of the fire chiefs October 26, 2006 memorandum 
regarding the washing and waxing of the unit employees' personal vehicles 
on weekends and after 3:00 p.m. on weekdays at the Eastside and Westside 
fire stations; 
2. will restore the prior practice regarding the washing and waxing of the unit 
employees' personal vehicles on weekends and after 3:00 p.m. on weekdays 
at the Eastside and Westside fire stations; and 
3. will make whole any unit employee meeting the conditions for such use who 
expended money on items other than materials due to the unilateral change 
announced in the October 26, 2006 memorandum, until such time as said 
practice is restored, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
City of Oswego 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAMPTON BAYS TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
CASE NO. U-26980 
HAMPTON BAYS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
TRICIA ALLEN, LABOR RELATIONS SPECIALIST, for Charging Party 
SHAW, PERELSON, MAY & LAMBERT, LLP (DAVID S. SHAW and 
STEVEN M. LATINO, of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Hampton Bays Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by Hampton Bays Teachers' Association, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO (Association) finding that the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused the Association's 
requests for certain information and documents it sought for the investigation of a 
potential grievance and, following the filing of the grievance, for its processing on behalf 
of a probationary teacher.1 
1
 40 PERB 1J4583 (2007). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the District contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that it had 
a duty under §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act to provide the Association with the 
requested information and documents. The District asserts that the requested 
information relates to the termination of a bargaining unit member under the statutory 
procedures set forth in Education Law §3031 and, therefore, is...unrelated to contract 
administration. In addition, the District contends that the ALJ applied the wrong legal 
standard in concluding that the District is obligated to provide the requested information 
and documents. The District also challenges the ALJ's conclusion that reference to 
Education Law §3013 in Article XII of the parties' July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010 collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement) is a typographical error. Finally, the District asserts 
that the ALJ erred in ordering the production of two documents on the ground that 
disclosure is prohibited under the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 19742 
(hereinafter, FERPA). 
The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Article XII of the parties' agreement is entitled "Teacher Probation and 
Evaluation". Article XIl(A) provides: 
A. PROBATION - The Hampton Bays School System will 
employ the legal minimum probationary period in each 
tenure area, mindful, however, of the provisions of Section 
3013 of the Education Law. The Principal will keep a 
probationary teacher informed in writing as to whether 
220USC§1232g. 
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he/she is rendering service satisfactorily in terms of the 
standards of the Hampton Bays Schools, and the Principal 
will, by April 1 of each year, prepare a written statement 
concerning the Annual General Evaluation of each 
probationary teacher. Two copies of said evaluation will be 
drafted. The original will be presented to the Board before 
becoming a part of the teacher's permanent record. The 
duplicate will become the teacher's personal property. 
1. A probationary teacher who is not to be 
recommended for tenure will be so. notified in writing 
by the Superintendent in accordance with the 
Education Law. Such notice will be provided no later 
than June 1. 
2. The provisions of these two preceding paragraphs are 
not subject to the Grievance or Arbitration 
Procedure, except if the H.B.T.A. feels that the 
District acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or 
discriminatorily; and in such event, the H.B.T.A. rights 
shall be limited only to the Grievance Procedure and 
excluded specifically under all cases from the 
Arbitration Procedure. 
In addition, Article XII(B) (9) and (10) of the agreement states that: 
9. All monitoring or observation of the work performance 
of a teacher will be conducted openly and with full 
knowledge of the teacher. The use of eavesdropping, 
public address or audio systems shall be strictly 
prohibited for supervisory purposes. 
10. Any significant criticism regarding a teacher made to 
the Administration or Board of Education by any 
parent, student, or other person that becomes part of 
the teacher's file will be promptly called to the 
teacher's attention. The teacher will be given fair 
opportunity to respond to such criticism to the 
Administrators (or Board of Education) as the case 
may be. 
Under Article XXIV(B) of the agreement, the District is prohibited from placing 
adverse written materials in a teacher's file unless the teacher has received a copy or 
has had an opportunity to read the material. Article IV states that all policies of the 
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Board of Education concerning terms and conditions of employment remain in effect 
unless modified, deleted or superseded by the agreement. 
Prior to June 8, 2006, the District employed Corrine Aube (Aube) as a 
probationary physical education teacher with her probationary period scheduled to end 
on October 31, 2007. At a meeting on April 5, 2006, Superintendent of Schools Joanne 
Loewenthal (Loewenthal) advised Aube that she was being suspended pending a 
scheduled May 9, 2006 Board of Education meeting at which time Loewenthal intended 
to recommend Aube's probationary termination. Two Association representatives, 
Grievance Chair Stephen Lerner (Lerner) and Building Representative Roger Armstrong 
(Armstrong), represented Aube at the meeting. 
During the April 5, 2006 meeting, Aube received two letters from Loewenthal. 
The first states that Aube was being suspended based on an allegation that she had 
accompanied a District student to a club where an underage student consumed alcohol. 
The second sets forth Loewenthal's intent to seek Aube's termination pursuant to 
Education Law §3031. At Lerner's request, Loewenthal provided Aube and the 
Association with the name of the student referred to in the suspension letter. 
Immediately following the meeting with Loewenthal, Association representatives 
Lerner and Armstrong met with Aube during which Aube denied the allegations and 
stated her suspicion that the suspension and proposed termination were motivated by 
discriminatory animus. In addition, Aube provided Lerner and Armstrong with the names 
of two teachers who had been questioned by the District during its investigation. 
Thereafter, Lerner spoke directly with the two teachers named by Aube and learned the 
nature of the questions that they were asked by the District. Based on information 
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obtained from Aube and the two teachers, Lemer concluded that the District may be 
acting in an arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory manner toward Aube. 
On behalf of the Association, Lerner sent a memorandum on April 7, 2006 to 
Loewenthal requesting information about the District's investigation including the identity 
of all individuals who had been questioned along with the questions and responses. In 
support of the request, Lerner made reference to precedent under the Act requiring an 
employer to provide requested information to an employee organization for the 
administration of a collectively negotiated agreement including the investigation of 
potential grievances. 
Following consultation with the District's counsel, the District informed the 
Association that the District would not provide the Association with the requested 
information. On April 9, 2006, Lerner sent a follow-up memorandum to Loewenthal 
reiterating the need for the information and expanding the Association's request by 
seeking any negative written materials received by the District about Aube. The 
District's counsel responded with a memorandum stating that the District was not 
obligated to provide the Association with the requested information and documents 
under the Act because the District was acting pursuant to Education Law §3031 
procedures and that the District did not believe that the requested information and 
documents related to a "palpable" grievance. 
During a subsequent telephone conversation, Lerner advised the District's 
counsel that the information was relevant and necessary for the Association to 
investigate a potential grievance under Articles IV and XII of the agreement. One week 
later, on April 26, 2006, Lerner sent another memorandum, this time to the Board of 
Education, objecting to the District's continuing refusal to provide the requested 
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information and stating that the information is necessary and relevant to a probable 
grievance relating to "whether or not 'the District acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or 
discriminatorily"'. 
On May 1, 2006, Lowenthal sent a letter to Aube responding to her separate 
request for information underlying the decision to terminate. In the letter, Loewenthal 
cited to five alleged acts of poor professional judgment involving District students that 
included a reiteration of the two allegations contained in the April 5, 2006 suspension 
letter. 
On May 3, 2006, Lerner sent another memorandum to the Board of Education 
arguing that the proposed termination would be capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory 
and in violation of Article XII of the agreement. The memorandum also referred to 
Aube's positive probationary evaluations and an affidavit, accompanying the 
memorandum, from the student identified by Loewenthal during the April 5, 2006 
meeting. 
The Association commenced the grievance process at step one on May 4, 2006 
through an informal discussion with a District principal. The Association's grievance was 
filed under Articles IV(A), Xli(B)(9) and (10) and XXIV(B). The grievance challenged 
Loewenthal's actions toward Aube, the District's refusal to provide the Association with 
the requested information and documents and requested the identity of the individuals 
who conducted the investigatory interviews. During the informal grievance discussion, 
the Association informed the District principal that it may add additional articles of the 
agreement in support of the grievance. 
Loewenthal conducted a disciplinary interview of Aube on May 8, 2006. During 
the interview, Loewenthal particularized, in part, the content of her May 1, 2006 letter by 
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providing the names of the three additional students referred to in the letter. Although 
Loewenthal referred to a signed statement by one of the students, as well as personal 
notes or cards Aube allegedly gave to a student, Loewenthal was not willing to provide 
the Association with copies of the documents because of her concern that she had not 
received the requisite consent under FERPA. 
'-— Following the Board's approval of a resolutioaon May 9, 2006, terminating Aube 
effective June 8, 2006, the Association filed a notice of claim with the District alleging 
that it violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act when it failed to provide the requested 
information and documents. On or about June 2, 2006, Loewenthal provided Lemer 
with a redacted copy of a letter received by the District from a parent critical of Aube. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled under the Act that an employee organization has a general right 
to receive documents and information, requested from an employer, for use by the 
employee organization in collective negotiations, the resolution of negotiation impasses 
and in the administration of agreements including, but not limited to, the investigation of 
a potential grievance, the processing of a grievance and in the preparation for a 
grievance hearing and/or arbitration. The failure of an employer to produce requested 
information and documents may constitute a violation of both §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of 
the Act.3 
3
 Board of Education, City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, 6 PERB 1J3012 (1973); Hornell 
Cent Sch Dist, 9 PERB j[3032 (1976); State of New York (Dept of Health and Roswell 
Memorial Institute), 26 PERB 1J3Q72 (1993); City of Rochester, 29 PERB 1J3Q7Q (1996); 
Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB 1J3019 (2001); County of Erie and Erie 
County Sheriff, 36 PERB P021 (2003), confirmed sub nom. County of Erie and Erie 
County Sheriff v State of New York, 14 AD3d 14, 37 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dept 2004); Town 
of Evans, 37 PERB H3016 (2004); State of New York (OMRDD), 38 PERB 1J3036 
(2005), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 14 Misc3d 199, 
39 PERB 1J7009 (2006), affd, 46 AD3d 1037, 40 PERB 1J7009 (3d Dept 2007). 
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The Act also imposes a parallel duty on an employee organization, under certain 
circumstances, to provide information requested by an employer.4 
The general right to receive requested documents and information is subject to 
three primary limitations: reasonableness, which includes the burden on the responding 
party; relevancy; and necessity.5 
A request for documents and information must be sufficiently particular so that 
the necessity and relevancy of the requested information is reasonably discernible.6 In 
preparing a request, a party must be mindful of this specificity obligation. Moreover, as 
in the present case, it is a better practice, but not a statutory obligation under the Act, 
for a responding party, when it doubts the relevance and necessity of the request, to 
seek greater specificity, and not to simply ignore or refuse the request. 
Under the Act, an employee organization is entitled to a reasonable opportunity 
- ' to examine requested information and documents in the context of the contract terms 
before determining whether to file a grievance or to continue to process a grievance. 
Facts discerned from such information can result in the avoidance of unnecessary 
grievances, the quick resolution of meritorious grievances and/or the expedited 
processing of the grievance by the parties. In contrast, the refusal to respond to 
reasonable information requests can lead to the processing of avoidable grievances 
along with the filing of improper practice charges challenging the refusal under the Act. 
An agreement that contains negotiated terms and conditions that reiterate, 
expand, modify or touch upon statutory rights or procedures, does not eliminate the 
4
 See, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 409, 36 PERB 1J3034 (2003). 
5
 Board of Education, City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, supra, note 3. 
J 6 Salmon River Cent Sch Dist, 21 PERB 1J3005 (1988); State of New York (Unified Court 
System), 41 PERB 1J3009 (May 20, 2008). 
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obligation under the Act to provide requested information and documents bearing on 
those negotiated terms. The reiteration, modification or elimination of employee 
statutory rights constitute mandatory subjects under the Act so long as the proposal 
does not violate public policy.7 For the purposes of administrating a negotiated 
agreement, an employee organization is not precluded under the Act from receiving 
requested information and documents with respect to contract provisions that reiterate 
or modify statutory rights.8 
In certain limited circumstances, an employer may, under the Act, refuse to 
comply with an information request when it can demonstrate a legitimate claim that such 
production is prohibited by a specific statute, regulation or the common law.9 However, 
we agree with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that prior to a party refusing 
to release requested information or documents on such grounds, the party must first 
engage in a good faith effort with the requesting party aimed at accommodating the 
need for the requested information.10 Such a requirement is consistent with the policies 
of the Act by encouraging resolution of disputes and thereby avoiding unnecessary 
improper practice charges. 
7
 City of Cohoes, 31 PERB U3020 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Uniform Firefighters of 
Cohoes, Local 2562 v Cuevas, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd, 276 
AD2d 184, 33 PERB U7019 (3d Dept 2000), Iv denied, 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB 1J7018 
(2001). 
8
 State of New York (Unified Court System), supra, note 6; Town of Evans, supra, note 3. 
9
 County of Yates, 27 PERB 1J3080 (1994); City of Rochester, supra, note 3; County of 
Erie and Erie County Sheriff, supra, note 3; Town of Evans, supra, note 3; State of New 
York (OMRDD), supra, note 3. 
See, Roseburg Forest Products Co, 331 NLRB 999 (2000). 
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In the present case, the District argues that the Association's request for 
information and documents is not reasonable, relevant or necessary under the Act 
because it is allegedly unrelated to the Association's administration of the agreement 
and relates solely to procedures under Education Law §3031. In addition, it alleges that 
the Association lacked a legitimate contractual basis under the agreement to request 
information and documents. We disagree. 
Based on our review of the agreement, we conclude that the parties have 
codified both procedures and criteria for the evaluation of probationary teachers. While 
tenure determinations under Education Law §3031 is a prohibited subject, evaluation 
procedures and limitations on the right to discharge a teacher prior to the expiration of a 
probationary period are not.11 
The record fully supports the ALJ's conclusion that the Association's requests 
with respect to the District's investigation, including the names of the individuals 
interviewed, the substance of those interviews, copies of written statements received 
and the cards or notes allegedly given by Aube to a student are reasonable, relevant 
and necessary to an investigation into a grievance on behalf of Aube. 
The necessity and relevancy of the Association's request was reasonably 
discernible to the District as early as April 9, 2006 when the Association requested any 
negative materials about Aube received by the District. Under the circumstances of this 
11
 Cohoes City Sch Dist v Cohoes Teachers Assn, 40 NY2d 774, 9 PERB U7529 (1976); 
Board ofEduc ofElwood Union Free Sch Dist v Elwood Teachers' Alliance, 94AD2d 
692, 16 PERB <J7517 (2d Dept 1983); Bd of Ed of Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch 
Dist v Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 144 AD2d 666 (2d Dept 1988). See 
also, Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Assn and Monroe-Woodbury Board ofEduc, 3 PERB 
P104 (1970); Somers Faculty Assn, 9 PERB 1J3014 (1976); Elwood Union Free Sch 
Dist, 10 PERB 1J3107 (1977); Suffolk BOCES, Second Supervisory Dist, 17 PERB 
113043(1984). 
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case, the April 9, 2006 request was sufficiently particular to invoke Articles XII(B)(10) 
and XXIV(B) of the agreement. Thereafter, the Association both cited and quoted from 
Article XII(B)(2), thereby notifying the District that the materials were being sought to 
enable the Association to determine whether the District had engaged in arbitrary, 
capricious and discriminatory behavior toward Aube in violation of its contractual 
obligation.12 . 
!n addition, the record fully supports the ALJ's finding that the Association has a 
reasonable basis for requesting the information and documents. Prior to making its 
repeated requests, the Association received information, based on interviews with Aube 
and other bargaining unit members, suggesting that the District's investigation may 
have been conducted in an arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory manner in violation of 
Article XI 1(A)(2). Moreover, the student's affidavit and Aube's prior evaluations 
constitute a reasonable basis for the Association's continued requests for information. 
We are not persuaded by the District's contract interpretation arguments in 
support of its claim that the Association's requests are not necessary, relevant or 
reasonable. In order to be able to make an independent determination with regard to the 
merits or demerits of a grievance, the information is needed by the Association to 
investigate the potential grievance and thereafter to process the grievance it filed on 
behalf of Aube.13 
12
 We do not determine here the extent to which, in other circumstances, a party 
requesting information must make explicit reference to or quote from a specific contract 
term. 
13
 While the record in the present case establishes that the Association had an arguable 
contractual claim relevant to its request for materials from the District, we do not 
determine today what degree of viability of a potential grievance, if any, is necessary in 
every case for the duty to provide information under the Act to attach. 
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Furthermore, we deny the District's exception challenging the ALJ's conclusion 
that the agreement's reference to Education Law §3013 in Article XII constitutes a 
mutual error.14 As the ALJ correctly noted, the subject of Education Law §3013 is 
unrelated to teacher probation and tenure. Moreover, the parties referred to §3031, but 
not §3013, in their briefs to the ALJ and the Board. 
We next turn to the District's exceptions premised on FERPA. UnderFERPA, a 
school receiving federal funds is restricted from releasing certain education records 
about a student without the receipt of appropriate consent.15 The statute defines 
"education records" as "records, files, documents, and other materials" containing 
information directly related to a student, which "are maintained by an educational 
agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution."16 Upon a 
review of the District's exceptions and applicable law, we are not persuaded that, under 
) . . • 
FERPA, the two documents in question are "education records" prohibited from release 
without prior appropriate consent. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the District violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of 
the Act when it refused to provide the Association with the information and documents 
requested in the Association's April 7, 9 and 26, 2006 correspondence and during the 
May 8, 2006 meeting. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District shall: 
1440PERBat4742, n. 35. 
15
 See, Owasso Independent School Dist No 1-011 v Falvo, 534 US 426 (2002); 
Gonzaga University v Doe, 536 US 273 (2002). 
16
 20 USC §1232g(a)(4)(A). See also, 34 CFR §99.3. 
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1. Forthwith provide the Association with the information and documents 
requested in its April 7, 9 and 26, 2006 correspondence and during the 
May 8, 2006 meeting; 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to 
post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: May 20, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Junm. 
Jerome Lefkowftz, Chain 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Hampton Bays Union Free School District in the 
unit represented by the Hampton Bays Teachers' Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association) that the Hampton Bays Union Free School District will: 
1. Forthwith provide the Association with the information and documents 
requested in its April 7, 9 and 26, 2006 correspondence and during the 
May 8, 2006 meeting. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
HAMPTON BAYS UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED COLLEGE EMPLOYEES OF FASHION 
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-27057 
FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
Respondent. 
DAVID ENG-WONG, for Charging Party 
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. (BERTRAND B. POGREBIN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Fashion Institute of 
Technology (FIT) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that FIT 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally changed a past practice of paying day adjunct faculty represented by the 
United College Employees of Fashion Institute of Technology (UCE) on the basis of 16 
weeks of work, thereby reducing their salaries by one-sixteenth. 
The ALJ found that FIT violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally 
discontinuing the past practice of compensating day adjunct faculty by calculating their 
salary using a base of 16 weeks, which included 15 weeks of instruction and an 
additional week related to registration and other administrative duties. The ALJ found 
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that the practice was unequivocal and continued uninterrupted from at least 1978 to 
2006, when it was unilaterally discontinued by FIT. The ALJ dismissed the alleged 
violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act, finding that there was no evidence that FIT interfered 
with any activity protected under the Act.1 
The ALJ found that FIT had both actual and constructive knowledge of the 
practice, by reasonofthe reviewof..payroll by FIT managerial employees, the length of 
the practice and the preparation of FIT's annual budget. The ALJ rejected FIT'S 
arguments that the subject matter of the charge was nonmandatory, that UCE waived 
its right to negotiate and that the continued payment based on 16 weeks was an 
unconstitutional gift of public monies. 
EXCEPTIONS 
FIT excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by finding the 
existence of an enforceable past practice, by finding the practice involved a mandatory 
subject of negotiations, by rejecting its defenses of waiver and unconstitutional gift of 
public funds and by ordering the reinstatement and continuation of the at-issue rate of 
pay. 
UCE supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
1
 The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) had 
declined to process the alleged violation of §209-a.1 (e) of the Act. 
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FACTS 
UCE represents FIT's full-time and adjunct faculty. The adjunct faculty include 
both day-time and night-time instructors. The day-time instructors are known as day 
adjunct faculty. Adjunct faculty members are paid their hourly rate for the number of 
hours taught per week multiplied by a set number of weeks. There are 15 weeks of 
instruction in the fall and spring semesters. Prior to the commencement of instruction 
each semester, there is also registration week for students to sign-up for classes and to 
receive advisement from faculty on course selection. 
Since at least 1978, some day adjunct faculty members have been assigned by 
FIT to assist students during registration week. They received their assignment from 
department chairs to work four hour shifts during registration week. 
Spencer Schein, a full-time professor and the UCE's executive vice-president, 
was a day adjunct faculty member from 1978 to 1988, a department head from 1990 to 
1993 and a member of UCE's negotiations team during the contract negotiations. He 
testified that between 1978 and 2006, the salaries for all day adjunct faculty were 
calculated based on 16 weeks regardless of what work, if any, they performed during 
registration week.2 In addition, he testified that day adjunct faculty have been 
compensated at the hourly rate for any actual hours worked during registration week.3 
2
 In contrast, night adjunct faculty were never included in the registration process and 
their salaries have been calculated based on the 15 weeks of instruction. 
3
 Those day adjunct faculty members who received assignments for registration week 
from the department chairs submitted time sheets and were paid for the actual hours 
worked, in addition to having their salary calculated using the 16 week basis. 
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A September 28, 1988 memorandum from FIT Vice-President for Academic 
Affairs Janice Weinman to FIT Salary and Certification Manager Lois Boscio reiterated 
FIT's policy with respect to the calculation of day adjunct faculty salaries factoring in the 
registration week: "The Cabinet has reviewed the issue of payment to part-time faculty 
for registration and reaffirmed the college's policy that part of the 16 week responsibility 
of adjunct faculty is to register students." Consistent with this policy, day adjunct faculty 
continued to be paid a salary calculated based on 16 weeks. 
Over time, FIT's student registration process has become increasingly 
mechanized through telephone and on-line registration resulting in fewer day adjunct 
faculty being assigned to work at the in-person registration. Despite the decline in the 
use of the day adjunct faculty, all day adjunct faculty continued to be paid on a 16 week 
basis, regardless of whether they actually performed any duties during registration 
week. . , : . . . - . 
The payroll for the day adjunct faculty is signed off by the department .chairs and 
then approved by the deans. Payroll is certified by the Salary and Certification Manager 
in FIT's Human Resources Department. The salaries paid to day adjunct faculty for the 
fail and spring 2006 semesters were calculated based upon 16 weeks and totaled 
approximately $600,000. 
Prior to the commencement of negotiations for a successor to the parties' June 1, 
2002-May 31, 2006 collectively negotiated agreement, FIT's Vice-President of Human 
Resources and Labor Relations Annette Piecora (Piecora) was advised by her staff that 
all day adjunct faculty were being paid at the rate of 16 weeks and not 15 weeks, 
despite the fact that fewer day adjunct faculty were assigned to work registration week. 
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Piecora testified that from 1977 to approximately 1989, she had been a member of the 
UCE bargaining unit, in the Social Sciences Department and then in FIT's Personnel 
Administration. She worked, along with a number of day adjunct faculty, the week 
before classes began, at registration. Day adjunct faculty were paid for that week, for a 
variety of responsibilities, including registration, convocation and meetings. Piecora 
testified that after she left the bargaining unit, she was aware that fewer and fewer day 
adjunct faculty were being assigned to registration duties in the week prior to classes 
commencing because FIT was moving to a more mechanized registration process, 
beginning in approximately 1996. 
During collective negotiations on March 15, 2006, FIT added to its "areas of 
concern" the issue of 16 versus 15 weeks of pay for day adjunct faculty. FIT took the 
position that the day adjunct faculty were being paid for registration week when they 
actually did not provide any services. UCE disagreed. Thereafter, the parties continued 
to discuss the issue at several subsequent negotiation sessions. 
At the April 27, 2006 session, UCE stated that during registration week, day 
adjunct faculty worked at registration, assisted students with adding/dropping classes, 
reviewed portfolios, held meetings with students and attended convocation. FIT 
responded that between 80% and 90% of student registration is completed by students 
on-line and that day adjunct faculty who actually work during registration submit time 
sheets and are paid for working during registration week. FIT claimed that the practice 
of paying all day adjunct faculty for 16 weeks no longer made sense and that if they 
were going to be paid for 16 weeks, they had to perform "real" work for all 16 weeks. 
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At the June 26, 2006 session, FIT stated that the day adjunct faculty were being 
paid for work that they were not doing and that FIT was going to stop paying day 
adjunct faculty for the 16th week and only pay those who actually performed work during 
registration week. 
On August 18, 2006, FIT Vice President Piecora sent a memorandum to all 
adjunct faculty stating that: 
It has come to our attention that some Adjunct faculty 
members have been erroneously receiving pay for an extra 
week for registration duties that are not being performed. 
Please be advised that effective this Fall 2006 semester, this 
will not be paid and the number of weeks of pay for adjuncts 
will be 15. This change is consistent with the number of 
weeks scheduled. 
Those of you who continue to perform registration 
responsibilities will be paid for time worked when you submit 
your time sheet to the Payroll office. 
Four days later, FIT informed UCE at a negotiation session that day adjunct faculty had 
been given the August 18, 2006 memorandum. UCE replied that FIT's actions were 
inconsistent with its duty to negotiate in good faith and that UCE would be filing an 
improper practice charge. The instant charge then followed. 
UCE and FIT continued their negotiations for 12 additional sessions. The 16 week 
basis for the computation of day adjunct faculty's salaries was not discussed at the 
negotiations table again. Following impasse in the negotiations, the parties participated 
in mediation and reached a tentative agreement on January 16, 2007. The minutes of 
the last session sets forth the terms for the new agreement; the memorandum is silent 
regarding the method of salary computation for day adjunct faculty.4 
J 4
 FIT Exhibit No. 1, January 16, 2007 negotiations notes. 
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D1SCUSS1QN 
The ALJ found that FIT violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally 
discontinuing the past practice of paying day adjunct faculty professors on the basis of 
16 weeks, thereby reducing their wages by one-sixteenth. FIT argues in its exceptions 
that there is no cognizable past practice, that it had neither actual nor constructive 
notice of the practice, that UCE waived its right to negotiate the change, and that the 
alleged practice involves a nonmandatory subject of negotiations and constitutes an 
unconstitutional gift of public monies. 
In Chenango Forks Central School District5 (hereinafter, Chenango) and more 
recently in Manhasset Union Free School District6 (hereinafter, Manhasset), we restated 
the applicable test for determining whether there is an enforceable past practice. Under 
that test, there must be a prima facie showing of a practice that was unequivocal and 
continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances to create 
a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees that the practice would 
continue. The reasonable expectation of the continuation is something that can be 
presumed from its duration with consideration of the specific circumstances under which 
the practice has existed.7 
Following the prima facie showing, an employer may present a defense 
demonstrating that it lacked either actual or constructive knowledge. However, as we 
noted in Manhasset, "constructive knowledge exists when the past practice is 
540PERBP012(2007). 
6
 41 PERB P005 (2008). 
7
 Supra, note 5 at 3047. 
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reasonably subject to the employer's managerial and/or supervisory responsibilities and 
obligations".8 
Here, UCE has established that the practice of calculating day adjunct faculty 
pay based on 16 weeks has been in existence since as early as 1978. Ten years later, 
FIT reaffirmed the practice in a memorandum stating that the payment for 16 weeks to 
the day adjunct faculty was based partially on the performance of duties during 
registration week. FIT continued this practice unchanged until 2006, despite the 
changes in the student registration process resulting in a decrease in the number of day 
adjunct faculty present at registration. Even before this decrease, not all day adjunct 
faculty were assigned to work at registration. Nevertheless, all of them were paid based 
upon a 16 week semester. Therefore, we conclude that UCE unit members had a 
reasonable expectation that the practice would continue unchanged. 
We find, as did the ALJ, that under the totality of the circumstances, FIT had 
either actual or constructive knowledge of the 30 year practice based on FIT's 1988 
Vice President for Academic Affairs' memorandum acknowledging the practice. The 
memorandum was addressed to FIT's Salary and Certification Manager who certifies 
the payroll for day adjunct faculty. The payroll is based upon the 16 week formula and 
includes the separate additional payment for work actually performed during registration 
week. In 2006, the practice accounted for approximately $600,000 of the annual 
budget.9 
Even without this direct evidence, the extended period of the practice alone 
s
 Supra, note 6 at p. 36. 
9
 Chenango, supra, note 5. 
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constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence, as found by the ALJ, to establish prima 
facie proof of sufficient FIT knowledge, thereby imposing upon FIT the burden of proof 
of demonstrating that, under the totality of the circumstances, it did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the past practice. 
FIT argues in its exceptions that the practice was equivocal, with Piecora 
testifying that only in the last ten years had day adjunct faculty been utilized to a lesser 
degree for registration week while still being paid on a 16 week basis. FIT also argues 
that there are only two registration weeks per year, too infrequent to establish a 
"longstanding" or "unequivocal" past practice. We reject FIT's arguments. 
We find that FIT failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the direct and 
circumstantial evidence demonstrating that it had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the practice. As we stated in Chenango, supra: 
... the extended period of the practice alone, under normal 
circumstances, would have constituted circumstantial 
evidence sufficient to establish prima facie proof of the 
employer's knowledge, thereby imposing upon the 
[employer] the burden of proof of demonstrating that under 
the totality of the circumstances it did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the past practice. 
Our conclusion regarding the [employer's] knowledge 
in the present case is not impacted by the fact that 
the...administrators and managerial staff may have changed 
over time. While it is true that under other circumstances a 
public employer may not be held responsible under the Act 
for every practice created by an individual supervisor or 
manager when it can demonstrate the absence of actual or 
constructive knowledge, in the present case the totality of 
the circumstances establishes that the [employer] had actual 
or constructive knowledge of the practice based upon the 
expenditure of revenue to multiple [employees], with such 
payments being subject to documentation in [the employer's] 
records, and, like all expenditures, also subject to review 
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during the preparation of annual budgets.10 
We do not reach FIT's argument that its announcement at negotiations of its 
elimination of the practice, along with UCE's alleged failure to contradict FIT's position 
or raise an objection, constitutes a waiver of UCE's right to object to FIT's unilateral 
action. FIT's defense is essentially one of waiver or duty satisfaction, which must be 
pled as an affirmative defense in its answer.11 FIT did not plead any affirmative 
defenses in its answer. We, therefore, do not address its arguments in this regard.12 
FIT also argues that payment to the day adjunct faculty for work not performed is 
a nonmandatory subject of negotiations.13 Despite FIT's characterization, the practice 
at issue here is a long-standing process of calculating the salary for day adjunct faculty. 
It may have had its genesis 30 years ago as payment for, among other things, duties 
performed during registration week, but at least ten years ago, when those duties 
decreased, it was continued by FIT as a method for calculating the salary of the day 
adjunct faculty. The wages to be paid to unit employees and the method for calculating 
them are mandatory subjects of negotiations; FIT was obligated to negotiate its decision 
10
 Supra, note 5 at 3047-3048. 
11
 NYCTA, 20 PERBfl3037 (1987), confirmed sub nom. NYCTA v New York State Pub 
EmplRelBd, 147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB TJ7001 (2d Dept 1989). 
12
 Further, we note that a waiver has not been found even when a subject is discussed 
in negotiations and the resultant collective bargaining agreement does not cover the 
subject. Port Washington Union Free Sch Dist, 8 PERB 1J3047 (1975). See also, City of 
White Plains, 12 PERB 1J4516 (1979). 
13
 FIT likens this case to Lynbrook PBA, 10 PERB P067 (1977) and City Sch Dist of the 
City of Newburgh, 14 PERB 1J4612, affd, 15 PERB P002'(1982), where'demands for 
payments to unit employees for loss of opportunities for premium pay assignments were 
found to be nonmandatory as demands for payment of a penalty for the denial of the 
loss of an opportunity to perform a service for a higher, or additional, rate of pay. 
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to change them.14 
Finally, we reject FIT's argument that the practice constitutes payment for work 
not performed and is, therefore, an unconstitutional gift of public funds. It is well 
established that where there is a legal obligation for a public employer to pay public 
employees, whether as a result of an arbitration award, a court decision, contractual 
language or the continuation of a past practice under the Act, such payment does not 
constitute a prohibited gift.15 In the present case, the method of wage calculation for day 
adjunct faculty constitutes an enforceable past practice under the Act that FIT may not 
alter unilaterally. Based upon FIT's legal obligation under the Act to continue the 
payments, such payments do not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds.16 
Based on the foregoing, we find that FIT violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by 
unilaterally discontinuing the past practice of computing the wages paid to the day 
adjunct faculty on the basis of 16 weeks. We, therefore, deny FIT's exceptions and 
affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that FIT shall: 
14
 Act, §201.4; Bd ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 22 PERB P011 
(1989). The time and method of payment of wages is mandatorily negotiable. County of 
Orange, 12 PERB 1J3114 (1979), confirmed sub nom. 76 AD2d 878, 13 PERB ^7009 
(2dDept1980). 
15
 Board of Education Union Free School District No. 3 of the Town of Huntington v 
Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 NY2d 122 (1972). See also, South Colonie 
Teachers Assn v South Colonie Cent Sch Dist, 135 AD2d 150, 22 PERB 1J7501 (3d 
Dept 1988); Buffalo Sewer Auth, 20 PERB 1J4538 (1987); City of Lackawanna, 28 PERB 
1J4690 (1995); Town ofCarmel, 29 PERB 1J7016 (Sup Ct Albany County 1996), affd, 246 
AD2d 791, 31 PERB1J7002 (3d Dept 1998); City of Buffalo, 35 PERB 1J6602 (Sup Ct 
Albany County 2002). 
16
 Antonopoulou v Beame, 32 NY2d 126 (1973). 
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1. Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost as a result of 
the unilateral reduction of day adjunct faculty pay by one-sixteenth, plus 
interest at the maximum legal rate; 
2. Restore to unit employees the practice of paying day adjunct faculty utilizing 
the method that existed prior to the unilateral change set forth in the August 18, 
2006 memorandum; and 
3. Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all locations normally used for 
communications with employees in the unit. 
DATED: May 20, 2008 




Robert S. Kite, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT) in the 
unit represented by the United College Employees of Fashion Institute of 
Technology that the FIT: 
1. Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if 
any, lost as a result of the unilateral reduction of day 
adjunct faculty pay by one-sixteenth, plus interest at 
the maximum legal rate and 
2. Restore to unit employees the practice of paying day 
adjunct faculty utilizing the method that existed prior 




Fashion Institute of Technology 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, LOCAL 1070, 
Charging Party, 
- and- .... 
CASE NO. U-27031 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
EDDIE DEMMINGS, GENERAL COUNSEL (THOMAS COOKE of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
JAMES P. WELCH, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
(RICHARD W. McDOWELL, of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the State of New York -
Unified Court System (UCS) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by District Council 37, AFSCME, Local 1070 (DC 37), 
finding that UCS violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when UCS refused DC 37's request for documents and 
information for its representation of a bargaining unit member who received a notice of 
charges issued pursuant to the disciplinary procedures contained in the UCS-DC 37 
collectively negotiated agreement (agreement).1 
1
 40 PERB 1J4595 (2007). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, UCS contends that the ALJ erred in finding that it violated the 
Act by failing to provide DC 37 with the requested materials based on the following: 
a) the charge is untimely; b) DC 37 waived its right to obtain the information and 
documents; c) UCS satisfied its duty to negotiate; d) the negotiated disciplinary 
procedure is a restatement of the regulatory disciplinary procedures promulgated by the 
Chief Judge; e) DC 37's request is unrelated to contract administration; f) requiring the 
production of information and documents is inconsistent with public policy and would 
constitute the creation of a pre-hearing discovery procedure; g) the requested materials 
are contained in confidential and privileged investigatory files; and h) DC 37's request is 
both unreasonable and overbroad, and it seeks unnecessary and irrelevant materials. 
DC 37 supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties" 
arguments, we grant UCS's exceptions, in part, but affirm the ALJ's decision and modify 
the remedial order. •> 
FACTS 
Article 13 of the agreement between UCS and DC 37 sets forth the disciplinary 
procedures applicable to certain UCS competitive and non-competitive class employees 
as well as other employees with prior military service or who are exempt volunteer 
firefighters. 
Pursuant to §13.2 of the agreement, disciplinary action against unit members is 
initiated by the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge or the Administrative Director through 
issuance of a notice of charges specifying the bases for the disciplinary action and the 
proposed penalty. Prior to invocation of this disciplinary procedure, a request for 
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discipline is reviewed by the UCS Counsel's Office to determine whether there is a 
sufficient factual and legal basis for issuance of disciplinary charges or whether there is 
a need for further investigation. 
Pending a hearing and determination of the disciplinary charges, an employee 
may be suspended without pay for a period not to exceed thirty days. Under the 
agreement, the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge or her designee has the discretion to 
permit an employee to utilize annual leave accruals during the suspension; such 
decisions are not grievable or otherwise reviewable. 
Under the disciplinary procedures, UCS is required to serve the notice of charges 
on the employee by personal service or, if not possible, by certified mail, return receipt 
requested. In addition, UCS is required to send written notice to DC 37 identifying the 
name and work location of the employee who has been served with charges. As a 
matter of practice, UCS sends DC 37 a copy of all notices of charges issued against DC 
37 members. 
An employee has eight days to file a written answer to the charges and is 
entitled to be represented by DC 37, a private attorney or appear pro se. The hearing is 
conducted by a hearing officer selected by the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge or 
Administrative Director. Pursuant to the agreement, UCS and DC 37 have a labor-
management subcommittee that recommends individuals to be on a fixed panel of 
hearing officers to be utilized for disciplinary hearings. 
Article 13 is silent on the issues of pre-hearing exchange of information or 
supplementation of charges through bills of particulars. As a matter of general policy, 
UCS routinely denies pre-hearing demands for the production of documents and 
information. At its discretion, however, UCS has responded to such demands in the 
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past by producing documents prepared by the charged employee such as time sheets, 
evaluation statements and public records. When such documents are produced, they 
are accompanied by a UCS disclaimer stating that the production is solely aimed at 
expediting the process and does not constitute an admission by UCS that it has a legal 
obligation to do so. In addition, UCS has provided documents and information and 
responded to a demand for a bill of particulars in response to a directive from an 
assigned hearing officer. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, written recommendations are submitted by the 
hearing officer to the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge or Administrative Director. 
Upon request, the employee is entitled to receive a copy of the recommendations and to 
submit his or her comments within three days. If an employee is found guilty of the 
charges, he or she can seek review through a petition to the Chief Administrative Judge 
or by the commencement of an Article 78 proceeding. 
In August 2005, DC 37 member Domingo Vergara {Vergara) was served with a 
notice of charges, pursuant to Article 13 of the agreement, alleging that he engaged in 
incompetence, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to good order and efficiency by 
being absent from his assigned courtroom in Bronx County Supreme Court on two 
occasions. In February 2006, UCS served Vergara with 11 additional disciplinary 
charges alleging further acts of misconduct. 
DC 37 assigned an in-house attorney to represent Vergara at the disciplinary 
hearing before the selected hearing officer. On June 20, 2006, DC 37's attorney sent a 
letter to UCS seeking documents and other information that were asserted to be 
relevant and necessary to DC 37's representation. The letter requested the following: 
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•N a. Copies of all documents, including, without limitation, 
i any memoranda between or among agents of the 
Office of Court Administration (OCA) referring or 
relating to Vergara's conduct or behavior which is the 
subject of this charge. 
b. Copies of all documents and other tangible evidence 
that the OCA may rely upon at the proceeding. 
c. Copies of all statements, in any form, made by 
witnesses the OCA may call at the proceeding. 
d. Copies of all statements, in any form, made by any 
otherwitnesses to the events related to this charge..~ 
e. Copies of all statements, in any form, made by 
Vergara with regard to this charge. 
f. Copies of all rules, regulations, or other standards of 
conduct that the OCA alleges were violated with 
regard to this charge. 
g. Identification by name, employment title, office 
address and office telephone number of each witness, 
whether or not employed by the OCA that the OCA 
may call at the proceeding. 
h. Identification by name, employment title, office 
address and office telephone number of any official of 
. the OCA who investigated the allegations brought 
) against Vergara. If a report was put in writing a copy 
of the report. 
Subsequently, Vergara was served with two additional charges, dated July 24, 
2006. On August 14, 2006, DC 37 faxed a follow-up letter to UCS, with a copy to the 
hearing officer appointed by UCS. The letter asked that DC 37's pending request for 
information be made applicable to the July 24, 2006 charges and stated that DC 37 
needed the materials for the scheduled August 29, 2006 disciplinary hearing. The letter 
further stated that DC 37 planned on filing an improper practice charge if the materials 
were not produced by August 17, 2006. On or about August 18, 2006, DC 37 filed the 
charge herein. 
By letter, dated August 24, 2006, UCS denied DC 37's request stating that pre-
hearing discovery is not a part of the negotiated disciplinary procedures but suggesting 
j 
y 
that DC 37 make an application for discovery to the appointed hearing officer. UCS 
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objected to DC 37's request on various other grounds including vagueness, 
burdensomeness, relevancy, privilege and confidentiality but agreed to provide DC 37, 
prior to the hearing, with copies of the exhibits UCS intended on offering into evidence. 
On September 6, 2006, the appointed hearing officer issued a decision denying 
DC 37's June 20, 2006 request on the grounds that pre-hearing discovery is not 
required under the principles of due process and that the negotiated disciplinary 
procedures are silent with respect to an obligation to provide the requested materials. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, UCS contends that the improper practice charge should be 
dismissed as untimely based on UCS's long and consistent policy and practice of 
denying requests for pre-hearing discovery in disciplinary cases. 
Eight years ago, in Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District2 (hereinafter, 
Greenburgh), the Board articulated the applicable test with respect to the timeliness of 
charges in cases involving the denial of requests for information: 
In cases involving a request for information necessary for the 
processing of grievances, contract administration or contract 
negotiations, each request for information and each 
subsequent refusal to provide information or failure to 
respond to the request gives rise to a separate violation of 
the Act. Therefore, the timeliness of a charge alleging a 
violation based upon the refusal to provide such information 
may be measured from the date of the last, not first, refusal 
to provide information.3 (footnote omitted) 
Based on the holding in Greenburgh, we conclude that UCS's refusal to provide 
DC 37 with materials in prior disciplinary cases does not render the present improper 
practice charge untimely. 
2
 33 PERB 1J3059 (2000). 
3
 Id. at 3165-3166. 
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Furthermore, we deny UCS's exception asserting that DC 37 waived its right to 
obtain requested materials under the Act based on UCS's policy of routinely denying 
pre-hearing discovery and providing certain documents in some cases under its own 
terms or in compliance with a directive from the selected hearing officer. 
The Board will find waiver only where there is proof of an "intentional 
relinquishment of a known right with both the knowledge of its existence and an 
intention to relinquish it" and where the waiver is "clear, unmistakable and without 
ambiguity."4 Based on the circumstances in the present case, the UCS policy is 
insufficient to establish a waiver by DC 37 of its rights to requested materials under the 
Act to represent bargaining unit members facing discipline. The record establishes that 
DC 37 did not accept or acquiesce in the UCS policy. It, in fact, continued to make 
requests in advance of scheduled disciplinary hearings.5 
We similarly reject UCS's exception premised on its duty satisfaction defense. 
In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 409,Q the Board rejected an 
employee organization's duty satisfaction defense to an employer's charge alleging that 
the employee organization violated the Act by failing to provide requested information. 
The duty satisfaction defense in that case was based upon the terms of a settlement 
4
 County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 36 PERB1J3021 at 3065 (2003), confirmed sub 
nom. County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff v State of New York, 14 AD3d 14, 37 
PERB H7008 (3d Dept2004) [quoting CSEA v Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 686, 15 PERB 
H7011 at 7021-22 (3d Dept 1982), app dismissed, 57 NY2d 775, 15 PERB 1J7020 
(1982).] 
5
 UCS did not argue before the ALJ or in its exceptions that its policy constitutes a. 
binding past practice on DC 37 under the Act. Even if UCS had raised such a defense, 
it would be without merit because a past practice analysis is inapplicable to the general 
statutory right under the Act to receive requested information. 
; 
6
 36 PERB 1J3034 (2003). 
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memorandum wherein the employee organization agreed to provide the employer with 
certain information. In rejecting the duty satisfaction defense, the Board found that the 
information that was the subject of the charge was outside the scope of the information 
the employee organization was contractually obligated to provide. In the present case, 
the agreement between UCS and DC 37 is silent with respect to an obligation to provide 
information and documents.Therefore, we find no merit to UCS's duty satisfaction 
defense. 
We next turn to UCS's exceptions claiming it is not obligated to provide the 
requested materials to DC 37 because the negotiated disciplinary procedures are 
similar to the procedures promulgated by the Chief Judge, the request is unrelated to 
contract administration, the requirement to produce materials under the Act is 
inconsistent with public policy and constitutes the improper creation of a pre-hearing 
discovery procedure. 
In general, an employee organization has the right, under the Act, to receive 
information and documents requested from an employer, for use by the employee 
organization in negotiations and in policing the administration of a negotiated 
agreement. This obligation stems from the right of public employees to self-
organization and representation and is aimed at insuring that their chosen bargaining 
agent can effectively represent their interests consistent with its statutory duties and 
obligations under the Act.7 
7
 Board of Education, City Sen Dist of the City of Albany, 6 PERB fl3Q12 (1973); Home!! 
Cent Sch Dist, 9 PERB H3032 (1976); State of New York (Dept of Health and Roswell 
Memorial Institute), 26 PERB 1J3072 (1993); City of Rochester, 29 PERB 1J3070 (1996); 
Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB fl3019 (2001); County of Erie and Erie 
County Sheriff, supra, note 4; Town of Evans, 37 PERB P016 (2004); State of New 
York (OMRDD), 38 PERB ^3036 (2005), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State 
Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 14 Misc3d 199, 39 PERB 1J7009 (Sup Ct, Albany County, 2006), affd, 
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The general right to receive requested documents and information is subject to 
three primary limitations: reasonableness, which includes the burden on the responding 
party; relevancy; and necessity. As the Board stated in Board of Education, City School 
District of the City ofAlbany (hereinafter, City of Albany): 
In both cases, the obligation of the employer would be 
circumscribed by the rules of reasonableness, including the 
burden upon the employer to provide the information, the 
availability of the information elsewhere, the necessity 
therefore, the relevancy thereof and, finally, that the 
information supplied need not be in the form requested as 
long as it satisfies a demonstrated need.8 
An employee organization has the initial burden under the Act to establish that 
the request is sufficiently specific and particular so that the necessity and relevancy of 
the requested information and documents is reasonably discernible.9 
The general right to receive requested information extends to an employee 
organization's representation of an employee who is the subject of discipline under the 
negotiated terms of an agreement.10 Contrary to UCS's argument, this general rule is 
fully consistent with the policies and intent of the Act. Providing requested information 
can lead to harmonious and cooperative relationships through the early resolution of 
disciplinary disputes, the clarification of relevant issues to be determined, and an 
46 AD3d 1037, 40 PERB TJ7009 (3d Dept 2007); Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist, 
41 PERB H3008 (May 20, 2008). 
8
 Board of Education, City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, supra, note 7, at 3030. 
9
 Salmon River Cent Sch Dist, 21 PERB P006 (1988); Hampton Bays Union Free Sch 
Dist, supra, note 7. In order to avoid delays and the filing of unnecessary charges, if the 
necessity and relevance of a request is not clear on its face, or the request is deemed 
ui I I c a o u i lau ic VJI u v c n y U U I U C I ISU I ne , 11 i© a u o u e i j j i aouoe , U U I i I U I ct s icuu iu i y u u n y a u u i i, 
for the responding party to make a request for greater specificity or the narrowing of the 
request. 
10
 County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, supra, note 4; Town of Evans, supra, note 7; 
State of New York (OMRDD), supra, note 7. 
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expedited arbitration or contractual hearing. Moreover, the production of materials can 
aid an employee organization in making a merits-based decision whether or not to 
provide representation to a bargaining unit member facing discipline under an 
agreement. 
Relying on County of Ulster11 (hereinafter, Ulster) and Town of Orangetown12 
(hereinafter, Orangetown), UCS contends that it is not obligated to produce information 
and documents under the Act because Article 13 adopts the disciplinary procedures 
promulgated by the Chief Judge. We disagree. 
In Ulster and Orangetown, the Board held that when an employee organization is 
providing representation to an employee solely in the context of a statutory disciplinary 
procedure, the right to receive requested information and documents under the Act is 
inapplicable. Both Ulster and Orangetown are premised on the principle that, in general, 
the duty of fair representation under the Act does not mandate an employee 
organization to provide representation to pursue an individual's statutory rights or 
claims.13 In Ulster, the Board also stated that its holding was unaffected by the choice 
of the parties to explicitly refer to Civil Service Law §75 in their agreement because that 
reference did not convert the statutory procedure into a contractual obligation. 
11
 26 PERB H3008 (1993). 
12
 39 PERB H3012 (2006). 
13
 PEF (Hartner), 15 PERB P066 (1982); UFT (Paul), 23 PERB 1J3038 (1990); Town of 
Orangetown, supra, note 11. The primary exception to this general rule is that an 
employee organization may not refuse to pursue an employee's statutory rights for 
arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith reasons. 
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Subsequent to Ulster, however, the Board in City of Cohoesu (hereinafter, 
Cohoes), held that a proposal seeking to reiterate, modify or waive employee statutory 
rights may constitute a mandatory subject of negotiations unless the proposal is 
inconsistent with public policy. Cohoes was based, in part, on the Board's conclusion 
that the reiteration of statutory language in an agreement can lead to additional rights, 
duties and remedies.15 Moreover, -in. Town of Evans™ (hereinafter, Evans) the Board 
ruled that an employer was obligated to provide requested information based upon a 
negotiated disciplinary article that replaced Civil Service Law §75 procedures with a 
grievance arbitration clause but permitted the use of that statutory procedure upon the 
agreement between the parties. 
It is common for collectively negotiated agreements in the public sector to contain 
some form of disciplinary article. The terms of such provisions can vary widely, both 
substantively and procedurally. Some agreements merely reiterate or make reference 
to, while others modify or expand, the coverage of a statutory disciplinary procedure. 
Yet other agreements replace a statutory procedure with a contractual article permitting 
the imposition of discipline that is subject to challenge through a grievance procedure 
ending in binding arbitration. Negotiated disciplinary procedures can also provide for the 
14
 City of Cohoes, 31 PERB1J3020 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Uniform Firefighters of 
Cohoes, Local 2562 v Cuevas, 32 PERB Tf7026 (Sup Ct, Albany County 1999), affd, 
276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d Dept 2000), Iv denied, 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB 
117018(2001). 
15
 Even prior to Cohoes, employers were obligated to negotiate the modification or 
vvaivci u i o icuu iu iy u iaoipm lai y p i u o c u u i c o . nuuuui rvuisG LUOCJ/ / &vJ V I i&iouy, \j£. r\\jc\x 
12, 11 PERB 1J7003 (3d Dept 1978), affd, 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB 1J7006 (1979). Cf, 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB fl7006 (2006). 
16
 Supra, note 7. 
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issuance of a notice of disciplinary charges subject to a grievance, written appeal or 
answer with the dispute ending in binding arbitration or a final determination by the 
employer. Some parties agree upon hybrid provisions, like the one in Evans, that 
include elements of both grievance arbitration and statutory disciplinary procedures. 
We conclude that Cohoes and Evans modified the holding in Ulster to the extent 
that it suggests that the negotiated reiteration or incorporation of a statutory disciplinary 
procedure into an agreement might not implicate the statutory duties and responsibilities 
under the Act, including the obligation to provide requested information and documents 
to an employee organization. Further, the effect of Cohoes is that the incorporation of a 
statutory procedure into an agreement may result in contractual obligations on the 
parties. Whether an agreement creates a contractual obligation triggering the duty to 
provide information is dependent on the terms of the agreement and the role of the 
employee organization in the negotiated disciplinary procedure. 
In the present case, the disciplinary action against Vergara was initiated by UCS 
under Article 13 of the parties' agreement. Article 13 does not refer to the regulatory 
disciplinary provisions promulgated by the Chief Judge.17 However, a fair reading of 
Article 13 establishes that it reiterates and, in fact, modifies the disciplinary rules issued 
by the Chief Judge. While Article 13 includes a disciplinary process similar to the 
disciplinary procedures promulgated by the Chief Judge, it also contains various 
provisions expanding the procedural rights of the DC 37 bargaining unit including: 
specifying the manner of service of the charges on employees, requiring DC 37 to 
receive notice of the charges, granting DC 37 input into the panel of hearing officers 
used in disciplinary hearings, and permitting bargaining unit employees the ability to 
17
 22 NYCRR §25.29. 
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utilize accrued leave during a suspension.18 We conclude, therefore, that the terms of 
the agreement in the present case, are sufficient to create a contractual obligation 
triggering UCS's statutory duty to provide the requested information to DC 37. 
We agree with the ALJ that, for purposes of an employee organization 
administering an agreement, there is no meaningful distinction under the Act between a 
negotiated disciplinary grievance procedure and one calling for the filing of an answer in 
response to a notice of charges. Whether disciplinary action can be grieved, answered 
and/or appealed under a negotiated procedure, an employee organization has a duty to 
administer that provision under the Act. It follows that in order to fulfill that duty, an 
employee organization is entitled to receive, upon request, relevant and necessary 
information in order to effectively represent a member charged. 
We do not agree with UCS's argument that the obligation to provide information 
and documents under the Act constitutes an impermissible imposition of pre-hearing 
discovery similar to that obtainable in civil litigation or in aid of arbitration.19 In 
Greenburgh,20 the Board expressly ruled, based on persuasive precedent from the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and other state public employment relations 
boards, that the duty to provide information and documents under the Act continues 
through the arbitral process. Subsequently, in County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff2^ 
(hereinafter, Erie) and State of New York (Office of Mental Retardation and 
18
 It is also notable that Article 13 does not include an explicit right to representation 
during a disciplinary interview although such a right exists under 22 NYCRR 
19
 See, CPLR §3102(c). 
20
 Supra, note 2. 
21
 Supra, note 4. 
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) 
Developmental Disabilities)22 (hereinafter, OMRDD), the Board found that the statutory 
duty is applicable when an employee organization requests information in preparation 
for a disciplinary arbitration. Based on Greenburgh, Erie and OMRDD, we conclude that 
the obligation to provide requested information attaches to the negotiated non-
arbitration hearing process in the present case because DC 37 has an obligation under 
the Act to administer the contractual procedure and properly represent Vergara at 
the disciplinary hearing.23 In reaching this conclusion, we note that under the standards 
originally articulated in City of Albany,24 the obligation to provide requested materials 
under the Act turns on the facts and circumstances of each case and is intended to be 
less formal and narrower in scope than permissible discovery in litigation. In fact, the 
application of New York or federal civil procedure rules is inappropriate when such rules 
are inconsistent with the policies and purposes of the Act.25 
22 Supra, note 7. 
23
 Contrary to UCS's argument, the NLRB has not held that an employer's obligation to 
provide information and documents under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 
USC §§151-158, discontinues at arbitration. See, NLRB v Acme Industrial Co, 385 US 
432 (1967) (concluding that that a liberal "discovery-type" standard of relevance is 
applicable to a private employer's obligation under the NLRA to provide a union with 
requested material needed for the processing of a grievance). See also, Transport of 
New Jersey, 233 NLRB 694 (1977); Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co, 259 
NLRB 225 (1981) enforced sub nom. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co v NLRB, 
687 F2d 633 (2d Cir 1982).The NLRB has, however, issued decisions finding that 
certain materials do not have to be provided under the NLRA. See, Tool & Die Maker's 
Lodge 78 (Square D Co), 224 NLRB 111 (1976); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 237 NLRB 982 
(1978); New Jersey Bell Telephone Co, 300 NLRB 42 (1990) enforced sub nom. NLRB 
1/ KI/^IA/ Inrrmi, D^ll T^ls\r\l->s\tir\ /""^ ClOCZ CO/-I AAA IOA f^\v ACiC\A\- f~*ryllfnrv*in Nliire>r\r> A or.*-. 
v IVGVV ot7/oc7_y uc7» i <?i<?fjiIWIit? \-"~i, c o u i ^.u i t t \ o u vyii i d o i ) , KSCIIIIWI i net i v u ; o c o n o o / i , 
326 NLRB 1362(1998). 
24
 Supra, note 7. 
25 MABSTOA, 40 PERB fl3023, n.16 (2007). 
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Based on the negotiated disciplinary provision in the DC 37-UCS agreement, we 
conclude that UCS is not exempted from the general duty under the Act to provide DC 
37 with requested materials in order to represent a member subject to disciplinary 
charges. The mere fact that their agreement, like the agreement in OMRDD, permits 
individual legal representation by counsel in a disciplinary matter, to the exclusion of 
employee organization representation, does not nullify the general rule requiring 
production of requested information under the Act. Rather, when an employee is 
represented on an individual basis by an attorney under such a provision, the employee 
relinquishes the benefits associated with employee organization representation 
including the statutory right to information production. 
We next turn to UCS's exceptions claiming that DC 37's request improperly 
seeks confidential and privileged materials contained in its investigatory file. 
In Erie, Evans and OMRDD, the Board rejected confidentiality and privilege 
arguments as grounds for refusing to provide requested materials contained in 
investigatory files in those cases.26 The Board emphasized in Evans that when a party 
objects to an information request on confidentiality or privilege grounds, that party has 
the burden "to explain fully and clearly the facts and circumstances upon which the 
claimed exemption is based."27 
In UCS's exceptions, it asserts a generalized confidentiality and privilege claim 
relating to the content of its disciplinary investigatory file. Its assertion is based on a 
broad public policy argument that fails to meet its' burden under Evans including, at 
See also, County of Yates, 27 PERB 1J3080 (1994). 
Supra, note 7, at 3050. 
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minimum, identifying the specific material it believes to be exempt from the duty to 
produce. Therefore, we deny UCS's confidentiality and privilege argument. 
Finally, we examine UCS's contention that DC 37's June 20, 2006 request is 
unreasonable, unnecessary and overly burdensome. Based on the facts and 
circumstances of the present case, we conclude that DC 37 has failed, in part, to meet 
its burden of making a sufficiently specific and particular request for documents and 
information under the Act.28 
In the first part of its request, DC 37 seeks copies of all documents "including, 
without limitation, any memoranda between or among agents" of UCS "referring or 
relating" to Vergara's alleged behavior. On its face, this aspect of the request is 
overbroad, unnecessary and unduly burdensome. It fails to identify who constitutes a 
UCS "agent" and it would require UCS to conduct a multi-borough search of its offices 
and computers aimed at finding every memorandum, whether hard copy or electronic, 
that may make some reference, regardless of relevancy, to Vergara's charged 
misconduct. As drafted, this aspect of the request goes well beyond seeking materials 
needed by DC 37 to defend Vergara. Therefore, we find that UCS did not violate the Act 
when it failed to provide materials in response to the first paragraph of DC 37's request. 
In contrast, we find that the remainder of DC 37's request seeking, inter alia, the 
identity of witnesses, hard copy of witness statements, and the documentary evidence 
UCS intends on introducing, is reasonable, relevant and necessary to enable DC 37 to 
properly represent Vergara. In so ruling, we have examined NLRB precedent 
determining that the production of employee witness statements, identification of 
witnesses and evidence to be presented at arbitration are not required under the NLRA 
28
 Supra, note 9. 
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and find the reasoning of those decisions unpersuasive based upon the policies of the 
Act.29 
Based on the foregoing, we grant UCS's exceptions, in part, and find that it 
violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act when it refused to provide DC 37 with various 
information and documents requested in DC 37's June 26, 2006 letter. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. UCS30 shall provide DC 37 with the following for purposes of providing 
representation in defense of unit member Dominic Vergara (Vergara) during a 
disciplinary hearing: 
a. Copies of all documents and other tangible evidence that it may rely upon 
at the disciplinary hearing against Vergara; 
b. Copies of all statements by witnesses, in any form, that UCS may call at 
the disciplinary hearing against Vergara; 
c. Copies of all statements, in any form, made by any other witnesses to the 
events alleged in the disciplinary charges against Vergara; 
d. Copies of all statements, in any form, made by Vergara with regard to the 
disciplinary charges against him; 
e. Identification of all rules, regulations, or other standards of conduct that 
UCS alleges were violated with regard to the disciplinary charges against 
Vergara;31 
f. Identification by name, employment title, office address and office 
telephone number of each witness, whether or not employed by UCS, that 
UCS may call at the disciplinary hearing; and 
g. Identification by name, employment title, office address and office 
telephone number of any official of UCS who investigated the allegations 
29 Anheuser-Busch, Inc, supra, note 23; California Nurses Assn, supra, note 23. 
30
 The ALJ's remedial order has been modified to make reference to UCS rather than 
no a u i i ill noti ciii vc C I I I I I , ii ic wi l low ui v u u i i n u i i in lion auwi i, a i i u LU o i a i n y n i d i u i o n a m 
copy documents and information UCS is to provide under the order relate to the 
disciplinary charges and hearing rather than a proceeding. 
31
 To the extent DC 37 does not have possession of the identified rules, regulations or 
other standards, a copy should be provided by UCS. 
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brought against Vergara. If a report was put in writing, a copy of the 
report.32 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to post notices 
to unit employees. 
DATED: May 20, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Nothing in our order should be construed as requiring UCS to permit DC 37,to 
contact witnesses during the work day in the absence of a contractual or other right 
permitting such employee organization access. 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Unified Court System (UCS) in the unit represented by 
District Council 37, AFSCME, Local 1070 (DC 37) that UCS will provide DC 37 with the 
following for purposes of providing representation in defense of unit member Dominic Vergara 
(Vergara) during a disciplinary hearing: 
a. Copies of documents and other tangible evidence that it may rely upon at the 
disciplinary hearing against Vergara; 
b. Copies of all statements by witnesses, in any form, that UCS may call at the 
disciplinary hearing against Vergara; 
c. Copies of all statements, in any form, made by any other witnesses to the events 
alleged in the pending disciplinary charges against Vergara; 
d. Copies of all statements, in any form, made by Vergara with regard to the pending 
disciplinary charges; 
e. Identification of all rules, regulations, or other standards of conduct that UCS alleges 
were violated with regard to this charge; 
f. Identification by name, employment title, office address and office telephone number 
of each witness that UCS may call at the disciplinary hearing; 
g. Identification by name, employment title, office address and office telephone number 
of any UCS official who investigated the allegations brought against Vergara. If a 
report was put in writing, a copy of the report. 
Dated. By 
(Representative) (Title) 
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not 
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5621 
VILLAGE OF RYE BROOK, 
Employer. 
BARNES, lACCARINO, VIRGINIA, AMBINDER & SHEPHERD, PLLC (SAMER 
E. KHALAF of counsel), for Petitioner 
LITTLER, MENDELSON (CRAIG R. BENSON of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On June 27, 2006, Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of 
certain employees of the Village of Rye Brook (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Sr. Office Assistant (Building Department), Code Enforcement 
Officer, Communication Services Coordinator, Office Assistant 
(Financial Support), Recreation Leader, Intermediate Account 
Clerk, Jr. Civil Engineer, Office Assistant (Automated Systems) 
and Recreation Assistant. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on March 18, 
2008, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 20, 2008 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5636 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF STATE POLICE), 
Employer, 
NEW YORK STATE POLICE INVESTIGATORS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 4, IUPA, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (AMY PETRAGNANI of 
counsel), for Employer 
BLITMAN & KING, LLP (JULES L. SMITH and KENNETH L. WAGNER of 
counsel) and JOHM M. CROTTY, ESQ., , for Incumbent/lntervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 30, 2006, the Police Benevolent Association of the New York State 
Troopers, Inc. (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the State of New York (Division of State Police) 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Investigators, Senior Investigators and Investigator Specialists. 
Excluded: All others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on May 6, 2008, at 
which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 20, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
") 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFUERS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
& HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5775 
TOWN OF SPAFFORD, 
Employer. 
) CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 317, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public empioyer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
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grievances. 
Included: All full-time Motor Vehicle Operators. 
Excluded: All elected officials, office clerical and all other Town employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the .above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Local 317, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: May 20, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert's. Hite, Member 
